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EFORE DAWN ON TUESDAY MORNING, OCTOBER 30, IN
the midst of flooding and damaging winds from Hurricane Sandy, New York University’s (NYU’s) most
fragile patients, premature infants, were carried down
9 flights of stairs in the dark and transported to hospitals on
dry ground.1 Although the infants arrived safely, the midstorm evacuation of these critically ill patients was concerning. A safer daylight transfer before flooding overwhelmed
southern Manhattan would have been preferable. The Veterans Affairs (VA) New York Harbor hospital evacuated patients before the storm.2 Bellevue, New York’s flagship public hospital, evacuated patients in the immediate aftermath
of the storm when the backup power supply failed.3,4 These
neighboring hospitals each made different decisions about
when to evacuate. Across the New York City metro region,
many hospitals, nursing homes, and assisted living facilities
were evacuated, most of them after the storm hit, making this
the central public health challenge of this calamitous event.
It is a familiar story—a superstorm comes ashore, infrastructure is overwhelmed, and health care facilities evacuate
patients, with major delays in returning to normal functioning. Afterwards, policy makers evaluate lessons learned for
the next disaster, but similar missteps are often repeated. Why
did some health care facilities with the same risk level evacuate while others did not? Although the 2 storms were different in many ways, it is instructive to compare Hurricane Katrina with the still-unfolding events of Sandy.

Success Amidst Failure
The emergency hospital evacuations of 2 of Manhattan’s landmark medical facilities—NYU Langone Medical Center
evacuated 300 patients during the storm, and the next day
Bellevue Hospital evacuated 700 patients—struck a similar
chord to the catastrophic loss of medical infrastructure in
New Orleans in 2005. Ad hoc decisions made in the midst
of crisis cost patients their lives during Katrina and were
second-guessed in the courts.
Unlike during Katrina, New York hospitals during Sandy
had more detailed emergency plans and access to betterpositioned backup generators, many placed on high floors
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to protect against flooding. Fuel pumps in some hospitals
were left in basements because of building code restrictions but were encased in concrete to protect against floods.
Indeed, NYU engineers prepared the hospital against an unprecedented 12-ft flood, but not the actual 14 ft that Sandy
delivered, causing pumps to fail.
As a result of post-Katrina planning, New York hospitals
had capabilities to manage evacuations, demonstrating a measure of success. Hospital staff had transport equipment to
move patients within the facility; the federal Ambulance Contract developed in the wake of Katrina brought 350 additional ambulances to the city and ensured rapid response
by emergency medical service transport units; the Department of Health and Human Services deployed more than
1000 disaster medical personnel to assist in the response and
recovery; and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) placed urban search and rescue teams nearby as
the storm came ashore.
What seemed to be missing, however, were clear and consistent criteria to guide evacuation decisions. The Institute
of Medicine (IOM) has stressed the importance of advance
planning and protocols, with the ability to remain flexible
in the face of new information.5
Evacuation decisions are complex—a decision to evacuate prematurely places patients at risk, whereas waiting too
long can have devastating consequences. Hospitals are faced
with a variety of factors, many of which are in tension—
ranging from patient safety and lost revenue to communication and logistical capabilities. It is impossible to know
the reasoning of hospital administrators during Sandy, but
the VA acted decisively ahead of the storm, while 2 neighboring hospitals evacuated under far-from-ideal circumstances—which, in hindsight, appeared to have been the less
optimal choice.
At least 1 New York hospital failed to learn a critical lesson from Katrina—planning for the transport of physically
disabled or obese patients. Bellevue left 2 overweight patients sheltering in place6 when elevators failed, although a
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timely preemptive move to a room on a lower floor might
have minimized this risk.
Hospitals receiving evacuees had prepared for surge capacity. Consistent with IOM guidance, these hospitals shifted
delivery of care along a continuum from conventional to contingency response, utilizing facilities to deliver care functionally equivalent to normal operating conditions.5 Hospital lobbies served as patient reception areas, hallways
accommodated patient beds, staff-to-patient ratios changed
so that staff cared for more patients, and medical documentation requirements were adjusted. These strategies enabled hospitals to deliver care in a severely affected city.
Common Failures
The difficult lessons learned from Katrina did not result in
hardened medical facilities capable of withstanding catastrophic flooding. Joint Commission accreditation standards updated after Katrina were designed to enable facilities to function alone for 96 hours, emphasizing backup
power generation resistant to flooding and monthly capability tests. Yet these recommendations proved insufficient. Hospitals rarely placed their own vulnerabilities at the
center of mandated disaster exercises, in part because of the
ongoing need to provide patient care.
In the aftermath of Sandy, hospitals were unable to ensure continuity of operations, which is a hallmark of successful disaster plans. The Joint Commission urged the
redesign of infrastructure for future hospital construction
but considered retrofitting existing infrastructure costprohibitive. The latest disaster in New York City should reopen discussion regarding needed investments. The costbenefit calculus must include the long-term impacts. Delayed
reoccupancy of storm-damaged facilities has major public
health implications, including limited access to care, financial strain on local facilities, and stress on regional health
care systems that must accommodate the loss of medical
capacity.
Both Katrina and Sandy highlighted the difficulty in attaining “situational awareness”—the data and insights needed
to make strategic planning and response decisions. Loss of
communications due to power failures, combined with inaccessibility to affected communities, caused delay in recognizing the fragile state of nursing homes, assisted living
facilities, and hospitals. Public health authorities did not take
charge to coordinate strategic decisions. Notably, before the
storm, hospitals assured the mayor that “they were ready
for whatever comes.”7
The Future of Emergency Preparedness
Natural disasters are chaotic. Leaving crucial decisions to
health care facilities results in inconsistent action, potentially adverse to patient and public interests. Public health
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and emergency management agencies should develop protocols, ensure capacity, and guide crucial decisions in a disaster. Public officials, in collaboration with facilities, should
decide whether to shelter in place or risk transfer of fragile
patients. The secretary of Health and Human Services should
consider issuing an early public health emergency declaration to reduce legal concerns and regulatory constraints.
Investments to strengthen health care infrastructure to
withstand catastrophic events may seem unrealistic under
current fiscal restraints. However, the financial and public
health consequences of failing to invest will result in predictable hospital failures in the next disaster. Where possible, investments should be coordinated across multiple institutions, using health care coalitions to ensure resiliency.
For example, a joint venture linking neighboring Manhattan hospitals with shared equipment, supplies, infrastructure, and training would yield significant financial and health
advantages. Although there are major barriers to cooperation among private, city, and federal authorities, harmonization of planning and response is essential to ensure patient safety.
Facilities will require additional resources—financial, material, and intellectual—to meet the challenges of disaster
response. Investments should help ensure the operation of
health care services during and after a disaster. Communities cannot avoid natural and man-made disasters, and the
next event could be still more catastrophic. Federal, state,
and municipal authorities can better prepare for the next
disaster and have a duty to do so.
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